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Fire and explosion hazards in industrial storage units have gained a considerable attention in recent 
years. Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) storage terminal accident in Jaipur, India, is a recent example 
of Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) and fire accidents preceded by Buncefield (2005) and Puerto-
Rico (2009). On 29th October 2009, a leak of gasoline occurred in the IOC storage terminal. Long 
delay of 80 minutes in ignition led to a huge vapor cloud covering an area of 180,000 m2 over the 
entire installation and subsequent ignition triggered strong VCE with intensity more than 200 kPa. 
Eleven people lost their lives, more than 150 people were injured and a property loss of 
approximately U.S. $60 million was reported. The Individual and Societal Risk has been quantified 
and found that risk does not lie in the unacceptable region, but in the As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable (ALARP) region where substantial measures for a risk reduction were needed.  
The incident has left many safety issues behind which must be repeatedly addressed. It reveals that 
adequate safety measures were either underestimated or not accounted seriously. This article 
highlights the aftermaths of IOC incident and addresses challenges put forward by it. Furthermore, 
a comparative study is performed between such incidents to analyze the similarities and how they 
could have been avoided.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the availability of contemporary safety technologies, industries all over the world still 
frequently experience diverse hazardous incidents such as explosions and fires [1-4]. Such 
accidents are caused by different factors ranging from equipment malfunction to human error. The 
process may include the sudden release of stored fuel, resulting in the formation of a vapour cloud 
around the facility. Depending on the flammability and the presence of an ignition source, the 
vapour cloud may massively explode. This is referred to as a vapour cloud explosion (VCE) [5, 2-
 
 
3, 6-7], many incidents of which have be recorded over the last decade [8, 9].  Two such incidents 
occurred on a large scale in Puerto Rico, USA in 2009 and Buncefield, UK in 2005. These incidents 
exhibited striking similarities with another that occurred at the storage terminal of the Indian Oil 
Corporation Limited (IOCL) in Jaipur, India in 2009 [10-11].The full investigation reports of the 
Puerto Rico, Buncefield, and Jaipur accidents have been published [1-3]. 
 
It is estimated that the overpressure generated by a VCE is generally about 20–50 kPa [6-7] based 
on existing models. However, the peak overpressure generated during the IOCL, Jaipur accident 
unexpectedly exceeded 200 kPa. This colossal overpressure has been attributed to several factors 
such as congestions (e.g., by trees and bushes), which significantly induced a deflagration-to-
detonation transition (DDT) [12-16]. The severity of the explosion disaster was multiplied by the 
DDT, and this has necessitated a careful review of safety measures against the generation of 
overpressures. 
  
This paper considers the estimation of the safety distance from an explosion, very often covered 
by a large pool of fire. The strength of the explosion, number of affected tanks, and the surrounding 
conditions are some of the factors that determine the multiplicity of the ensuing fires. Subsequent 
explosions may also result in the engulfment of surrounding tanks and containers, leading to a 
violent fire. The affected area may range from a few meters to several kilometres, depending on 
the magnitude of the incident. The destruction resulting from large-scale incidents may reach the 
off-site population. This paper also considers the assessment of the individual risk and societal risk 
associated with the cumulative effects of explosions and fires. The total risk of the IOCL, Jaipur 
accident was found to fall within an unacceptable region, specifically within the as-low-as-
reasonably-practicable region (ALARP) where substantial risk reduction measures are needed. The 
consequences in and around the terminal were high, possibly due to the failure or absence of 
preventive measures.  Moreover, according to the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board 
(BMIIB) [5], poor land use planning (LUP) contributed to the site risk. The BMIIB suggested that 
LUP should be based on the risk level with efforts made to minimise the risk exposure of the 
surrounding population. Detailed risk assessment and analysis is thus required to implement 
adequate safety measures for avoiding or reducing the severity of accidents. 
 
The effective response to an accident is, of course, reduction of the severity of the consequences 
such as the loss of life and future productivity (Gurjar, 2015). This paper thus adduces different 
potential methods for mitigating vapour cloud explosions, and highlights the scope of further 
research towards improving the methods. 
 
2. BRIEF SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACCIDENTS 
The three above-mentioned major industrial accidents are further discussed in this section, namely, 
those that occurred at Buncefield (2005), Puerto Rico (2009), and Jaipur (IOCL) (2009). 
2.1. Buncefield, UK, (2005) 
In the early morning of 11 December 2005, Tank 912 at the Buncefield gasoline storage depot 
began to receive excess unleaded gasoline, resulting in an overflow and subsequent collection of 
petrol in the bund [5] Fig 1 shows a picture of the incident. Failure of the automatic safety switch 
alarm allowed Tank 912 to fill at more than twice the normal rate [5]. Using the relationship △p 
 
 
∝ V2, where △p is the pressure drop and V is the flow rate of the incompressible fluid, the tank 
was determined to have been subjected to a liquid overpressure of 2.2 times the normal operating 
value. This excessive overpressure apparently contributed to the formation of a vapour cloud under 
stable wind conditions (Atkinson, 2011), as well as the subsequent explosion of the cloud. Current 
knowledge of the overpressure of a vapour cloud explosion evidently underestimates the intensity 
of the overpressure at Buncefield. The estimated average value of 5 kPa could not possibly have 
caused the observed devastation, which was more reliably determined by damage analysis to have 
been due to an overpressure in excess of 200 kPa [6-7]. The diameter of the vapour cloud was 
estimated to be about 391 m, and the high-speed rotating machines in the pump house were 
postulated to have been the initial ignition source [5-7]. The effect of the overpressure was felt as 
far as 2 km from the centre of explosion [5]. Fortunately, there were no fatalities, with only light 
and severe injuries being the human consequences. 
2.2. Puerto Rico, USA (2009) 
An accident scenario similar to that at Buncefield occurred on the site of Caribbean Petroleum 
Corp. in Bayamon, USA on 23 October 2009. In the latter case, an uncontrolled flow of petroleum 
products, mainly gasoline, resulted in the formation of a vapour cloud, which caused a heavy 
explosion with very high overpressures (2.8 on the Richter scale) [2].Fig 2 shows a picture of the 
incident. The investigation report is still being prepared by the Chemical Safety Board of the USA 
and many details of the accident remain unconfirmed [2]. Eyewitness accounts support the 
similarity of the disaster to that at Buncefield [2]. 
2.3. IOCL, Jaipur, India (2009) 
 On 29 October 2009, a gasoline terminal belonging to the IOCL, located in the Sitapura industrial 
area near Jaipur, India, caught fire following an explosion, with the rage continuing for more than 
a week (see Fig. 3) [3]. The Oil Industry Safety Directorate of India investigated the incident [3] 
and found potential similarities with that at Buncefield, with the additional cause of human 
ignorance/mistake in the case of the Jaipur accident. However, from a scientific viewpoint, the 
occurrence was similar to the two above-mentioned incidents. The chain of events comprised tank 
overflow, vapour cloud formation in still air (low wind speed), ignition triggered at a 
pump/generator station, and eventual spreading of the fire to other tanks [3]. 
 
Figure. 1. Buncefield, UK fire accident (2005) [1]   Figure. 2. Puerto Rico, USA fire accident  
                                                                                   (2009) [2]                                         
 
 
     
Figure. 3. Sitapura, India fire accident (2009) [3] 
3. OVERVIEW OF IOC SITE 
An overall view of the site before the incident (taken from Google Earth) [17] is shown in Fig 4 
(north is approximately towards the top of the figures). The site measured approximately 750 m 
East–West and over 600 m North– South. The pipelines division of IOC occupied an area in the 
North West corner of the overall site, as shown on Fig 4. The majority of the buildings associated 
with the main terminal were located in the South West corner of the site, as was the main site 
entrance. The pipelines division area contained a number of other buildings including a separate 
control room. The IOCL plant covered an area of 485,625m2 and contained 11 tanks with a total 
capacity of about 110,370m3 for storage of gasoline, diesel, and kerosene. In addition, there were 
five underground tanks, each of 70 m3 capacity, for storage of gasoline and anhydrous alcohol. 
Seven buildings, a lubricating oil warehouse, and a truck loading facility also came within the 
ambit of the affected area. The entire area, confined by trees and buildings was enclosed by a 3 m 
height compound wall. 
 
4. ACCIDENT AND AFTERMATH 
The IOC, Jaipur incident was a major petroleum storage terminal accident in India. During the 
pipeline transportation of gasoline to another terminal, uncontrolled release of the gasoline 
occurred due to failure of hammer blind valve of Tank 401-A. This continued over a period of 80 
min before the ignition and explosion of the generated flammable vapour cloud. The total amount 
of released gasoline was about 1500 metric ton, which resulted in the formation of 81 metric ton 
of vapour cloud over an area of approximately 180,000 m2. The massive explosions caused by the 
ignition of the flammable vapour cloud resulted in intense fires, with the series of powerful 
explosions heard up to 32 km from the terminal. Seismological measurements indicated that one 
of the VCEs was equivalent to an earthquake of an intensity of approximately 2.3 on the Richter 
scale [3]. The aerial view of IOCL terminal before and after incident are shown in Fig 4 and Fig 
5.  
 
The massive explosions destroyed the entire terminal, as well as caused heavy damage to buildings 
in the immediate vicinity. The associated blast waves broke windowpanes up to 2 km from the 
terminal [3, 18]. After one of the major explosions, fire engulfed 11 large storage tanks. The fires 
burned for over a week, completely consuming the vegetation around the storage facility. The 
management of the IOCL had decided to allow the petroleum products to burn out to avoid the 




Eleven people lost their lives in the accident (six from IOCL and five outsiders) and more than 
150 people were injured. In addition, about 5,000 people in the surrounding area had to be 
evacuated from their homes [3]. This made the incident one of the most fatal accidents that 
occurred in the petroleum industry over the last decade.  
 
 
Figure. 4. IOCL, Jaipur terminal aerial view 
before fire incident 
 
            
Figure. 5. IOCL, Jaipur terminal aerial view 
after the fire incident                                                              
5. HAZARD CRITERIA 
Generally, a storage site for flammable liquids is designed in accordance with the standards 
prescribed by the regulating bodies. However, some industries have their own hazard mitigation 
plans. In either case, the consequences of explosions and fires must be addressed. Most 
importantly, the risks of explosion overpressure [6, 8] or/and thermal radiation [19-20] to people 
and the vicinity of the installation should be specified before the development and operation of the 
facility. In this article, explosion refers to vapour cloud or gas explosion, while fire refers to large 
single or multiple fire pools. 
 
6. ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS OF AN ACCIDENT 
 In the present study, the initial event (i.e. the accidental release) of the volatile product was 
analysed, and the VCE event was then modelled to determine all the possible consequences of the 
explosion. 
 
6.1. Release Rate 
As reported by the investigation committee [3], the sequence of the accidental events was initiated 
by the leakage of gasoline from a 0.25-m-diameter outflow pipe. This resulted in the discharge of 
a substantial amount of the flammable liquid. The initial mass discharge rate from the faulty 
hammer blind valve is given by Equation (1) [21] which assumes that the fraction is represented 
by the discharge coefficient CD and accounts for the pressure due to the liquid head above the 
leakage hole, hL. 
 
𝑚 = 𝜌𝜗𝐴 = ρ𝐴CD√2 (
g𝑃𝑔
𝜌⁄ + gℎ𝐿)                                         (1) 
 
 
 where 𝑚 is the mass discharge rate, 𝜗 is the fluid velocity, 𝐴 is the area of the hole, 𝜌 is the density 
of the liquid at 30°C, 𝑃𝑔 is the gauge pressure at the top of the tank (for a tank open to the 
atmosphere, 𝑃𝑔 = 0 ), and g is the gravitational constant. The density of gasoline is 740 kg/m
3 at 
NTP and the liquid head above the hole in the case study was 14 m. Using Eq. (1), the mass 
discharge rate was estimated to be 323 kg/s. 
 
For liquids that are accelerated during release, such as in a jet, a common approach is to assume 
an isentropic path. If the liquid temperature is less than its normal boiling point, the flash fraction 
would be zero [22]. 
 
6.2. Evaporation Rate 
The calculation of the vapour mass involved in the explosion is crucial to assessing the 
consequences of the accident. A more accurate result can be obtained by computing the 
evaporation rate of the gasoline during the accidental release. 
The evaporation rate per unit area, mmass, can be calculated by considering the two contributions 
to it, namely, from the pool area and from the liquid falling into the pool. The vaporisation rate 
under this condition is not as high as that from a flashing liquid or boiling pool, although it may 






                                                          (2) 
where MW is the molecular weight of the evaporating material, kg is the transfer coefficient, AP is 
the area of the pool, Psat is the saturation vapour pressure of the liquid, Rg is the ideal gas constant, 
and TL is the temperature of the liquid. As far as the pool evaporation term is concerned, the mass 
transfer coefficient can be computed as Equation (3). 
 
𝑘𝘨 = 0.002 × 𝑣
0.78  𝐿𝑃
−0.11    = 1.7× 10-3                                         (3) 
where 𝜗 is the wind velocity at a height of 10 m from the ground, and 𝐿𝑃 is the pool length. 
Using Equation (2), the gasoline evaporation rate for the present case study was determined to be 
17 kg/s. It was estimated that over the 80 min of the accidental release, about 81 ton of gasoline 
was discharged, resulting in the formation of a vapour cloud sufficient to cause a massive 
explosion. 
6.3. Formation and Size of the Flammable Cloud 
 The formation of a large, dense, and neutrally buoyant vapour cloud is facilitated by the following 
factors [11]. 
1. Still wind. 
2. Delayed ignition owing to effective control of potential ignition sources. 
3. Effective detection of loss of containment. 




The nearest meteorological measurements indicated that, on the evening of the accident, the 
weather was calm and stable, with an air temperature close to 30°C and a humidity of 25%. The 
weather was of Pasquill stability category D, with a wind speed of 1.5 m/s [3].  
 
The amount of air entrained into a cascade by momentum exchange is sensitive to the liquid mass 
density, which is in turn determined by the width of the spray zone [25]. In the case of the IOC, 
Jaipur incident, the vapour cloud formation was favoured by air entrainment, dispersion from the 
falling gasoline strings, and evaporation of the gasoline in the bund. The topography of the 
surrounding area and blockage by the undergrowth, storage tanks, and plant also hindered the 
favourable dispersion of the vapour cloud abroad, which might have mitigated the hazard. 
 
However, the vapour continued to spread as a gravity current, mixing with air at its leading edges 
and on its top surface, with the lower part remaining stratified and fuel rich. It seems reasonable 
to suggest that the centre of the cloud was deeper and richer in fuel than the edges [25-26]. Once 
initiated, a flame would flash through the flammable regions, leaving the rich mixture to burn more 
slowly as a diffusion flame. An assertion that the flammable limit would closely correspond to the 
top of the mist layer may not hold, except if justified by the thermodynamics of the local cloud 
and the atmospheric humidity [25, 27]. It has been difficult to comprehensively establish the 
mechanism of the cloud formation, and there are thus still several uncertainties regarding the 
source term of the vapour dispersion. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Dispersion of the vapour cloud in the southeast direction as determined by Phast Risk 6.7 
 Using the Phast Risk 6.7 software (DNV, Norway) (DNV, 2011), the total area of the cloud was 
determined to be of the order of 180000 m2 over a distance of almost 500 m and with an estimated 
height of 2 m over most of its area as shown in Fig 6. The wind direction at the time of the incident 
was 340° (NNW direction), with a stability class D. Figure 4 depicts the dispersion of the vapour 
cloud with varying material concentration towards the southeast, as determined by the Phast Risk 
6.7 software [28]. It was a massive cloud, both in absolute terms and compared with clouds 
observed in other incidents, and the size significantly contributed to the intensity of the explosion 
that occurred. The height of a vapour cloud is also important to its development. This study was 
undertaken to understand how the vapour cloud of the IOC, Jaipur incident spread over such a 
large area, and to obtain data that could be used for explosion modelling.  
6.4. Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) 
 
 
The consequence of a VCE is determined by a combination of several factors. Specifically, the 
overpressures generated by the VCE are primarily determined by the following factors: 
1. Flammability and quantity of the fuel. 
2. Degree of confinement/congestion. 
3. Source and strength of the ignition. 
4. Weather conditions. 
 
Most of the currently available empirical VCE models are typically based on the above four 
factors. The absence of one of the factors would significantly alter the probability and extent of 
the explosion. For example, if a vapour cloud is formed at a location where there is no ignition 
source or the wind speed is high, the vapour would be carried away with minimal risk of its 
accumulation [6-8, 12]. Many such possibilities exist and a careful review of the permutations and 
possible combinations of the factors is required for risk assessment. Significant studies have been 
conducted to achieve a consensus on the overpressure generated by the IOC, Jaipur VCE [11]. 
While some researchers assert that an excessive overpressure is incompatible with existing VCE 
knowledge, others indicate the likelihood of such high overpressures [7-8, 29]. Regardless of the 
actual situation, the applicability of available models was investigated in the present study. Three 
different methods for estimating the overpressure of a VCE are presented in the literature. They 
are briefly described below. 
 
6.4.1. TNT equivalent method 
 A common approach to determining the damage caused by an explosion involves estimating the 
‘TNT equivalency,’ which is the mass of TNT that would produce the same degree of damage 
[30]. In order to apply the TNT model to the evaluation of the impact of a VCE, the fraction of 
total energy of the explosion generated the shock wave must be estimated first. The main features 
of TNT and other high explosives have been extensively investigated and the materials therefore 
afford reliable references. Because of the availability of significant experimental data on the 
explosion characteristics of TNT, it is easier to use the material to extrapolate any given scenario. 




                    (4) 
  𝑍∗ =
𝑅
𝑊𝑇𝑁𝑇
1/3                                   (5) 
where W is the equivalent mass of TNT, ƞ is an empirical explosion efficiency, M is the mass of 
the hydrocarbon, 𝐸𝑐 is the heat of combustion of the flammable gas, and 𝐸𝑇𝑁𝑇 is the heat of  
combustion of TNT. Equation (4) includes the yield factor ƞ, typical values of ƞ are between 3% 
and 5%. However, for stoichiometric proportions and a heavily congested area, a value of 20% has 
been specified [16, 31-33]. In Eq. (5), R is the distance (m) from the centre of explosion. The on-
side overpressure can be estimated with the aid of a plot of the on-site pressure vs. scaled distance 
𝑍∗ (m kg−1/3) Equation (5), as shown in Fig. 7(a). This method can be used for initial estimation 
purposes. Its application to the IOC, Jaipur incident produced an overpressure of approximately 9 
kPa at a distance of 2 km from the source of explosion, based on a yield factor of 20% even for 




The biggest drawback of the method is its inapplicability to overpressures exceeding 100 kPa and 
small values of the distance𝑍∗. This is because the local pressure developed in the case of TNT is 
much higher than that for a flammable gas explosion, the waves of which travel over a longer 
distance. The overpressure estimations obtained by the method for far-field regions would thus be 
incorrect. In the case of the IOCL, Jaipur incident, it produced an overpressure of 13 kPa at 300 
m, based on the mass of the flammable fuel. 
 
6.4.2. Baker-Strehlow (BST) method 
This method is based on the Mach number MW (flame velocity), the reactivity of the fuel, and the 
level of congestion and confinement [8] Equations (6), (7), and (8) express the maximum 
overpressure𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥, dimensionless average on-side pressure?̅?𝑠, and the scaled distance?̅?. With this 
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                                      (8) 
 
For a medium-reactivity fuel, Mach number MW of 0.55, total available energy E1 (J), and high 
level of congestion, the overpressure would be 50 kPa. Figure 7 (b) shows a plot of ?̅?𝑠 against?̅?. 
The same overpressure values were estimated for the other two above-mentioned accidents for a 
Mach number of 0.55 (generally valid for hydrocarbons). 
 
6.4.3. TNO (multi-energy method) 
This is the most widely used method in Europe [8, 34]. This model based on the principle that a 
vapour cloud explosion can occur only within that portion of a flammable vapour that is partly 
confined. Thus, the amount of energy generated during a VCE is limited either by the volume of 
the partially-confined portion of the flammable vapour cloud or by the volume of the vapour cloud. 
In both cases, the volume of the cloud within the partially-confined space can be transformed into 
a hemisphere of equal volume. It requires the determination of an appropriate explosion source 
strength. The maximum overpressure when using this method is as follows: 
 






2.7𝐷0.7/84                         (9)  
where 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum overpressure in kPa, VBR is the volume blockage ratio (%), 𝐿𝑓 is the 
flame path length (m), D is the average obstacle diameter (m), and 𝑆𝐿 is the laminar burning 
velocity of the flammable mixture (m/s). The dependence of the dimensionless overpressure 
(Equation (9)) on the distance (Equation (8)) is shown in Fig. 7 (c). In the application of this 
method to the IOCL, Jaipur incident using VBR = 4%, 𝐿𝑓= 50 m, D = 0.3 m, and SL = 0.46 m/s for 
hexane, the overpressure was estimated to be >200 kPa.   
 
 
              
                                                                                                                              
Fig. 7. VCE overpressure versus the scaled distance based on the (a) TNT, (b) BST, and (c) TNO 
models [30] 
  
6.4.4. Estimation of maximum peak overpressure 
The present study particularly considered the estimation of the maximal peak overpressure ∆Pmax 
generated by an unconfined VCE (UVCE) and a confined (partially confined) VCE. Hailwood et 
al., [35] reported that the course of a UVCE should be treated as a deflagration (∆Pmax < 100 kPa) 
or a detonation (∆Pmax > 100 kPa). `Taking this into account, the formula can be derived for the 
spherical pressure waves of unconfined and partially confined VCEs between the flame front 














                                                      (10) 






⁄                                                              (11) 
The range of 𝜀1 is approximately 7–8 [36] for stoichiometric hydrocarbon-air mixtures. 
The other important parameters of a VCE are the shock wave velocity, maximum dynamic 
pressure, and maximum reflected overpressure (Lee, 1980). The shock wave velocity in air, U, can 
be calculated using Equation (12): 
 




                    (12) 
where 𝐶0 is the speed of sound in air, and P and 𝑃
0 are respectively the atmospheric pressure and 
maximum overpressure. A shock wave generated by a massive explosion is estimated to travel at 





(a) (b) (c) 
 
 
The dynamic pressure 𝑞0 is the transformation of the kinetic energy of the wind generated by an 
explosion into pressure energy when it encounters a solid surface in its path. For an explosion in 








                  (13) 
 
Where 𝑞0 is the maximum dynamic pressure. 
Lastly, it is important to consider the maximum overpressure due to the wave reflection. When the 
pressure wave hits a solid surface not parallel to its propagation direction, there is a reflection, the 
pressure of which varies not only with  𝑃0 , but also with the angle of incidence. The maximum 
overpressure takes place when the pressure wave hits the overpressure experienced and that which 





















2                                                                (14) 
where (Po)r is the overpressure generated on a surface perpendicular to the direction of propagation 
due to the reflection, and r is the ‘reflected’ overpressure. Equation (14) indicates that the 
maximum reflected overpressure is at least twice𝑃0; it may be as much as eight times𝑃0. However, 
for a weak explosion, 𝑃0 may be lower than the atmospheric pressure. The dynamic pressure and 
reflected overpressure with respect to the maximum overpressure (˃200 kPa) have been 
determined to be 0.32 and 2.7 bar, respectively [11]. The extent of damage of the terminal due to 
over pressure is shown in Fig 8. The damage due to the explosion causes further loss of 
containment, resulting in a fire that engulfs a number of fuel storage tanks on the site. 
 
   
Fig. 8. Extent of damage due to overpressure at the IOC, Jaipur site  
 
6.5. Deflagration-to-detonation transition (DDT) 
Unlike deflagration, detonation is self-sustaining and propagates across open areas when the 
concentration of the vapour cloud is within the detonable limits, which are generally similar to the 
flammable limits of common hydrocarbons. The directional indicators are thus more widespread 
[38]. A critical requirement for transition from deflagration to detonation is a maximum turbulent 
 
 
burning velocity that is sufficiently high for the gas velocity ahead of the flame to generate a 
sufficiently strong shock wave [39-40]. 
 
In the case of the IOCL, Jaipur incident, the most probable cause of the detonation was the entry 
of a flame into either the pipeline control room or the pipeline pump house located in the northeast 
corner of the site. Such would cause a confined or partially confined explosion that might initiate 
a detonation as it vented from the building [38]. The damage of the pipeline control room building 
and the pipeline pump house are shown in Figs. 9 and 10. As can be observed from Fig. 9 the 
damage to the south side of the building was much more severe than that to the north side. The 
complete collapse of the building on the south side indicates the propagation of the waves towards 
the pipeline area, from the south side. Figure 8 also shows the damage to the pump house from the 
south side. The bending of the trees towards the northeast is a directional indicator. The same can 
be observed from Fig. 11.  
 
                           (a)                      (b)                   
Fig. 9. Damaged control room in the pipeline area of the destroyed IOCL, Jaipur terminal: (a) 
north side, (b) south side 
 
Fig. 10. Damaged pipeline pump house on the south side of the pipeline control building of the 
destroyed IOCL, Jaipur terminal 
   
 
 
The two following observations validate the above explanation of the pipeline control room 
damage: 
[1] There is a clear dividing line between the high-pressure damage on the south side of the 
control room, and the lower-pressure damage on the north side. This is also supported by 
the apparent lack of damage to the trees on the north side of the control room, as can be 
observed from Fig. 8(a). 
 
[2] The downwards collapse of the roof on the south side (Fig. 9(b)) notably does not appear 
to be consistent with an internal explosion, which would vent outwards from the north side 
of the building. The venting of flames from the building might have induced a transition to 
detonation, with the high external pressure pushing the partially failed roof downwards. 
This description is physically plausible. 
The directional indicators point to the source of the detonation as being located in the pipeline area 
in the northeast corner of the site [38].  
 
Fig. 11. Directional indicators: trees bent in the northeast direction, towards the pipeline area of 
the destroyed IOCL, Jaipur terminal 
 
There was a confined explosion in the control room which could have eventually led to a transition 
to detonation of the vapour cloud on the south side, or could have enhanced the flame propagation 
towards the pipeline pump house farther to the south. This hypothesis is supported by the 
reattachment of the wind flow to the ground on the downwind side, and the mean velocity 
remaining lower than it is upwind at the same height above the ground. In addition, the turbulence 
all over the wake is greater than on the upwind side. Thus, the flammable material near the building 
has a higher concentration in the building wake than it would have if the building were absent. In 
addition, enhanced turbulence accelerates the flame near and far downwind of the building. The 
directional indicators are therefore produced by a combination of the asymmetric propagation of 
the detonation and the effects of the direct overpressure. 
 
A deflagration-to-detonation transition due to the trees along the north wall of the pipeline area 
has not been considered because there were no dense bushes at a lower level and some gaps were 
observed in the tree line. The gaps might have decelerated the transition. However, in the case of 
the Buncefield incident, the possibility of the detonation have been caused by flame acceleration 
at trees does not appear to be consistent with the evidence; rather the directional indicators could 
be explained by a detonation propagating through the low-lying vapour cloud [13]. Indeed, the 
 
 
evidence obtained from the IOCL, Jaipur site is highly consistent with the observations from the 
Buncefield incident, both in terms of the overpressure damage and the directional indicators. Table 
1 presents some important details of the accidents. 
 
6.6. Thermal radiation caused by a fireball 
Thermal radiation model resulted by a fireball was used to evaluate the damage caused by the 
explosion heat. In this study, the radiation flow on the affected surface area has been estimated. 
The total evaporated mass, estimated is required to apply this model.  Once the total evaporated 
mass is calculated, the current of radiation per surface area and time unit, I (Jm-2s-1) was 




              (15) 
𝐷𝑀𝐴𝑋 = 6.4 𝑚𝑣
0.325             (16) 
𝑡 = 0.825 𝑚𝑣
0.26              (17) 
 
where FR (dimensionless), the ratio between the energy emitted by radiation and the total energy 
generated by the combustion. The FR values are in the range 0.15 to 0.4, 𝑚𝑣 (kg) is the existing 
mass that contributes to the fireball, t (s) is the duration of the fireball, 𝐷𝑀𝐴𝑋 (m) is the maximum 
diameter of the ball. 
 
To estimate the radiation flux over the affected surface area IR (Jm
-2s-1) up to 100 m must be 
considered the geometric view factor, Fvg and the transmissivity τ, defined as the fraction of 
energy transferred and calculated about as follows: 
 
𝐼𝑅 = 𝐼𝜏𝐹𝑣𝑔                                                                                  





                     (19) 
The VCE was followed by a multiple tank fire (9 tanks immediate after VCE), which lasted for 
more than a week. 
 
7. Individual Risk and Societal Risk Assessment 
In this study, some rational assumptions were made to achieve more realistic estimates and 
analyses of the individual and societal risks associated with an explosion and/or fire at a petroleum 
product storage terminal. The release of the product was modelled by ordering the affected areas 
in and around the terminal, integrating the population density, and considering the time sequence 






7.1. Individual risk 
The individual risk was assessed by using the Phast Risk Vs 6.51 software to model the IOCL, 
Jaipur terminal and the surrounding area. The individual risk contours depicting the different risk 
levels are shown in Fig. 12. The highest risk level of 10-4/year occurs near the storage tank area at 
a distance of about 100 m from the gasoline release point. The next risk level of 10-5/year is 
observed at a distance of 280 m, still within the terminal. The risk levels of 10-4 and 10-5 per year 
correspond to the ALARP region, indicating that the risks on the terminal should have been 
lowered through the adoption of additional precautionary measures. The individual risk outside 
the terminal is lower than 10-6/year, which is acceptable. The quantitative risk assessment results 
thus indicate the inadequacy of the safety measures employed on the terminal, hence the severity 
of the accident.   
7.2. Societal risk 
As shown in Fig. 13, the F/N curve of the IOCL, Jaipur accident is within the ALARP region. This 
indicates tolerable risk to the surrounding population if appropriate precautionary measures are 
implemented. The accident that occurred could be attributed to the failure to periodically perform 
maintenance activities on the pipeline valves and other equipment and implement proper 
precautionary measures. 
 
      




  Fig. 13.   F/N curve for the IOCL, Jaipur terminal 
8.  
9. MITIGATION OF VCEs 
Inadequate attention has been given to the mitigation of VCEs. There are different methods for 
preventing such accidents apart from those regarding control room location and fortification, 
which utilise simple fuel-air blast prediction methods. Different potential methods for mitigating 
VCEs were considered in the present study, and the scope for their further improvement were 
identified, as discussed below. 
 
8.1. Plant Design and Layout 
Dedicated VCEs predictive tools for describing the combustion process in an expansion flow 
generated by turbulence in a congested are available for the design of industrial sites to limit the 
possibility of the occurrence of an explosion. The adopted safety measures may involve avoiding 
a dense concentration of equipment in any part of the installation, limiting the maximum flame 
path length, and allowing for open areas. Distinctive design details help avoid gas build up in 
heavily congested areas. All the foregoing measures also contribute to the mitigation of transition 
to detonation, as well as the prevention of local drag loading on installations such as pipes and 
pipe supports. The adoption of an appropriate design would prevent severe escalation in the event 
of the eventual occurrence of an explosion.  
 
The above mitigation measures are only implementable in the design stage of the plant and are no 
longer feasible after commencement of plant operations.   
 
8.2. Water Deluge 
 
A potential technology for limiting the consequences of VCEs is water deluge. This method can 
be applied to existing facilities through additional installation of the water deluge system. It 
 
 
requires the availability of a huge amount of water. In addition, considering the need to activate 
the water deluge system before ignition, the installation of a well-designed gas detection system is 
also required. The benefits of water deluge are widely recognised [42-44]. It has been established 
that only droplets smaller than 10–20 µm may prevent flame transmission owing to their 
evaporation in the flame. Larger droplets tend to break up before impacting the flame. The 
hydrodynamic forces that act on water droplets in an accelerating flow cause the droplets to 
disintegrate if they do not acclimate to the flow acceleration. The flow acceleration that occurs 
during an explosion in a congested surface area is typically capable of disintegrating droplets larger 




              (20) 
where ρ is the density of the gas mixture (kg/m3),  v is the velocity of the gas mixture stream 
relative to the droplet (m/s),  d is the diameter of the water droplet (m), and σ is the surface tension 
of the water (N/m).  
 
Breakup of the water droplet occurs when 𝑊𝑒 ≥ 10. Large-scale experiments have shown that, 
through water deluge, the maximum explosion overpressure generated by a VCE in a congested 
area can be reduced by a factor of 20 or more, with maximum overpressures of 10 bar or more 
specifically reduced to 0.5 bar or less [45]. 
 
 To improve the utilised model, it is necessary to acquire additional information regarding the 
mechanisms of the initial turbulence generation (relative to the water flux into the protected area 
and the dimensions of the protected area). It is also necessary to establish the water droplet 
disintegration dynamics and how the efficiency of the droplet break up can be enhanced, such as 
through the use of additives. The effects of the water droplet size and concentration on the flame 
propagation also require further investigation. 
 
 
8.3. Flame Inhibitor 
Another VCE mitigation method is the use of flame inhibitors, which may be either directly 
injected into the flame (post-ignition) or injected into the emerging flammable gas cloud (pre-
ignition). Medium-scale experimental investigations of this technology using both pre- and post-
ignition agents have been conducted [46-47]. The use of pre-ignition flame inhibitors was found 
to be very effective. As a pre-ignition agent, potassium carbonate was specifically found to be 
effective against several hydrocarbon gases in experiments performed in a 50-m3 congested vented 
enclosure. However, the efficiency of the flame inhibitors was found to be significantly dependent 
on the gas concentration, with flames in lean gas mixtures more easily quenched using relatively 
low inhibitor concentrations. Furthermore, the modality for injecting a pre-ignition flame inhibitor 
into a formed vapour cloud requires enhancement. 
 
10. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we undertook a post-VCE risk assessment for petroleum product storage facilities 
with the purpose of identifying appropriate preventive measures and developing an emergency 
response plan for mitigate the consequences of VCEs. Model simulations of VCEs, large tank fires, 
 
 
and individual and societal risks were employed, considering the particular case of the IOCL, 
Jaipur accident.  
 
VCEs are highly complex phenomena, with their destructive power determined by the type of 
flammable mass involved, the dispersion of the vapour cloud, and the reactivity of the formed 
gaseous mixture. The concentration, size, and location of the vapour cloud are particularly crucial 
factors, as evidenced by the particular case of IOCL, Jaipur investigated in this study. The 
observations from the IOCL, Jaipur site are consistent with those from a follow-up study on the 
site of the Buncefield VCE incident, both in terms of the overpressure damage and directional 
indicators. The observed damages were explained in terms of high-speed deflagration and 
transition to detonation. Overpressures in excess of 200 kPa (2 bar) were generated across the 
Jaipur site, although not uniformly distributed. 
 
 The observed severity of the Jaipur explosions was successfully explained based on current VCE 
knowledge and information available in the open literature. The overpressure damage and 
directional indicators revealed that the flammable vapour cloud covered almost the entire site. The 
widespread high overpressures and the directional indicators in the open areas also suggested that 
the VCE might not have been caused by deflagration alone. The overpressure damage and 
directional indicators suggested that the detonation most likely occurred in the pipeline area in the 
northeast corner of the site. Entry of flame into the pipeline area might also have caused a confined 
or partially confined explosion, possibly resulting in a detonation as it vented from the building. 
The possibility of the detonation being caused by the line of trees along the north wall of the 
pipeline area was ruled out because the area is not located deep in the lower levels and there were 
some gaps in the tree line.  
 
The individual and the societal risk estimates show that the risk levels to which population is 
exposed in and around the terminal do not exceed the tolerable limits proposed by the HSE UK 
standards and norms. The estimated risk at the terminal was under ALARP region where 
substantial measures for a risk reduction were needed. 
 
This is possible through design of petro-chemical facilities using better prediction tools, activation 
of water deluge upon gas detection or application of flame inhibitors both as a pre-ignition or post 
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